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Abstract 
This paper reviews the impact of the global economic and financial crisis on two distinct 
emerging market regions: Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) and Latin 
America. Similar to other emerging economies, both regions were initially surprisingly resilient 
as the crisis gathered momentum. They were, however, both strongly affected by the sharp 
retrenchment in capital inflows and the collapse of global demand that followed the demise 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Notwithstanding differences in the channels of 
transmission and the intensity of the propagation, the short-term outcome in 2009 was one 
of the deepest recessions in decades. As both regions differ in several important respects, 
the question arises how structural and institutional features as well as policies before and 
during the crisis have affected the transmission of global events to the two regions under 
review. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper looks at the impact of the global economic and financial crisis on two 
geographically distant and economically diverse emerging market regions: Central, Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) and Latin America.1 Similar to other emerging economies, 
both regions were initially surprisingly resilient to the global crisis for over one year. However, 
they were both strongly affected by the sharp retrenchment in capital inflows and the 
collapse of global demand that followed Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008. 
Although there were differences in the channels of transmission and the intensity of the 
propagation, the short-term outcome in 2009 has been one of the worst recessions in 
decades for both regions. 
In this paper, we compare economic and financial developments in both regions 
during the crisis, paying due attention to their differences, but also finding remarkable 
similarities. In the run up to the global economic and financial crisis, both regions were 
experiencing booming economic conditions, with rapid GDP and credit growth. Average 
annual GDP growth between 2002 and 2008 was 5% in the CESEE region and 4.3% in Latin 
America (graph 1). Both regions were receiving large capital inflows on the back of easy 
global liquidity conditions and favourable growth prospects. Economic growth was led by 
domestic demand, with private consumption providing the largest positive contribution to 
GDP growth, followed by investment. Net exports contributed negatively to GDP growth, 
in particular in the CESEE countries (-1.6% per annum on average in CESEE, however with 
very wide cross-country variation, and -0.8% in Latin America). As a consequence of the 
2002-2008 growth period, living standards in both regions increased significantly (graph 2) 
and poverty rates fell. 
Graph 1: GDP growth and its components 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
C
E
S
E
E
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
.
H
un
ga
ry
P
ol
an
d
R
om
an
ia
B
ul
ga
ria
E
st
on
ia
La
tv
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a
C
ro
at
ia
Net exports Stock changes*
GFCF Public consumption
Private consumption GDP growth
CESEE
GDP growth and its components in CESEE in Latin America
Source: Eurostat. National statistical offices. OeNB. BdE. *Including statistical discrepancy.
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a
B
ra
zi
l
A
rg
en
tin
a
C
hi
le
M
ex
ic
o
P
er
u
Ve
ne
zu
el
a 
C
ol
om
bi
a
Latin America
2002-2008 average. GDP growth: yoy change, %. Components: Percentage points contribution to annual growth
 
                                                                          
1. In CESEE we look at nine countries, which can be divided into three geographical sub regions, namely the three 
Central European countries (CEE) Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL) and Hungary (HU), the three Southeastern European 
countries (SEE) Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR) and Romania (RO) and the three Baltic countries Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV) and 
Lithuania (LT). The two CESEE euro area countries (Slovenia and Slovakia) are not covered in this paper. For the 
purposes of this study, Latin America means the seven largest economies of the region [Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Chile 
(CL), Colombia (CO), Peru (PE), Mexico (MX) and Venezuela (VE)]. 
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Graph 2: GDP per capita 
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Graph 3: Exports of goods and services 
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In addition to favorable global conditions, several region-specific features 
underpinned the strong growth momentum before the outbreak of the global economic and 
financial crisis. As for the CESEE countries, in particular two aspects distinguish them from 
other emerging economies.2 First, CESEE countries underwent a deep and historically 
unprecedented transformation from planned to market economies. This implied significant 
investment needs, as the pre-transition physical capital stock had become largely obsolete. In 
addition, economic transformation went hand in hand with a rapid change in economic 
integration patterns (graph 3). The regional reorientation of trade flows (away from previous 
COMECOM countries to the EU) was accompanied and in fact promoted by a shift from 
resource-based/low-tech exports to medium- and high-tech exports (graph 4). This helped 
                                                                          
2. On this issue see also Martin and Winkler (2009). 
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CESEE countries (being net importers of raw materials and energy) to successfully cope 
with the negative terms-of-trade shock resulting from the global commodity price boom 
before the crisis. The issue of regional trade reorientation is closely related to the second key 
distinguishing aspect of CESEE economies, namely their participation in the European 
integration process. Except for Croatia —which is expected to join the EU in the next few 
years— all CESEE countries under review have become members of the EU, an economic 
area with highly integrated goods, services, capital and (to a lesser extent) labour markets, 
and have adopted European standards for economic policy, institutions and governance. 
Moreover, all CESEE countries are sooner or later set to adopt the euro and are thus 
committed to striving towards the fulfilment of the convergence criteria laid down in the Treaty 
(ECB 2003). 
During the period of buoyant growth until 2008, financial vulnerabilities built up in 
some but not in all CESEE countries. Policy stances differed across countries, while the policy 
tool-box (e.g. as regards the management of capital flows) was constrained by EU accession 
and the depth of financial integration which increased considerably over the last decade, 
not least in terms of cross-border ownership of financial institutions (graph 5). 
Graph 4: Technological content of exports 
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Graph 5: Asset share of foreign banks1 
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1 For Latin America, following the IMF Western Hemisphere Regional Economic Outlook, assets include the main six 
foreign banks with global presence. This means that in some countries the actual share of foreign banks could be higher 
due to the presence of other international and regional banks. 
 
Turning to Latin America, this region was enjoying during the five year period up to 
2008 its longest and most dynamic growth period ever since the 1970s, having left behind 
the financial crises that had affected some countries of the region in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. A key driver for this performance was the impressive rally in commodity prices that 
took place during this period, and which meant an accumulated positive terms-of-trade shock 
for this commodity exporting region of more than 150%. A second key factor is the 
outstanding reduction in financial vulnerabilities that took place in most countries, though not 
in all, over the 2002-08 period on the back of improved economic policy management. 
Learning from the crises of the 1990s and from past policy mistakes, most countries in Latin 
America pursued sounder monetary and fiscal policies, adopted more flexible (though 
somehow managed) exchange rate regimes, and paid substantial regulatory attention to signs 
of excessive capital inflows, asset price bubbles, currency mismatches and credit booms. 
Such attention arguably moderated the risk of a boom-bust cycle. 
Against this background, the paper first reviews the macrofinancial strengths and 
vulnerabilities in CESEE and Latin America in the run up to the 2007/2008 global economic 
and financial crisis. To capture the macroeconomic strengths and vulnerabilities of CESEE 
and Latin America, we use a broad list of vulnerability indicators which are presented in the 
form of cobwebs. This allows for a comparison across indicators and time and thus for 
capturing risk profiles at the onset of the current crisis. It is important to keep in mind that the 
analysis is conducted at a regional level, and that considerable heterogeneity exists among 
countries both in Latin America and —even more so— in CESEE. Therefore, the regional 
results refer to stylized averages and are not necessarily indicative for the vulnerability profile 
of individual countries. 
Section 2 also provides an empirical analysis of the link between vulnerability 
indicators and the impact of the crisis (box 1) and explores to what extent economic policies 
in both regions helped to mitigate financial vulnerabilities in the run-up to the global economic 
and financial crisis, with a special box related to Latin America (box 2). This provides the 
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background for section 3, which reviews financial and real economic developments in the two 
regions since the start of the crisis in mid-2007 until the end of 2009. This section contains 
a box on cross border banking flows in CESEE countries (box 3). Section 4 includes a 
description and an assessment of the different policy responses to the crisis in the two 
regions. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Macrofinancial Strengths and Vulnerabilities at the Beginning of the Crisis 
Standard vulnerability indicators can be used to gauge the relative strengths and 
vulnerabilities of Latin America and CESEE. By standard vulnerability indicators we refer to 
economic variables which, according to the literature on economic and financial crises,3 
indicate potential risks or have good properties as leading indicators of crises. In this paper, 
we do so by comparing the status of those indicators before the current crisis with their 
relative position before other previous regional and global crises.4 
More specifically, we look at six sets of indicators which are described in more detail 
in table 1. These include indicators of market sentiment, external vulnerabilities, the banking 
sector, fiscal policy, monetary issues, as well as real and nominal indicators. The reference 
date we use for the global economic and financial crisis is September 2008 (Lehman 
collapse), as emerging economies have been affected by the crisis mostly only thereafter. The 
reference points in time are December 2001 (Argentine crisis) and August 1998 (Russian 
crisis). 5 
We present the vulnerability indicators in the form of cobweb charts. The charts 
should be read as follows: the closer a data point is located to the origin of the cobweb, the 
lower is the degree of vulnerability, and vice versa. Data are normalized based on their long 
term average and the standard deviation of the series.6 The impact of possible trends in the 
data, which could result from factors like structural reform or integration, is not accounted 
for, as there is no obvious method to filter out possible trend components in a robust way. 
This caveat calls for some caution in data interpretation. 
 
                                                                          
3. See among other Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). 
4. As a caveat, note that the methodology used allows for an indirect comparison across regions, but not a direct one, 
as the cobweb charts depict the deviations of each indicator from a long-term average. 
5. For daily and monthly data we use the weighted average of the six months before the month of the respective 
crisis and for quarterly data we use the weighted average of the four quarters before the quarter of the respective crisis. 
For Latin America regional aggregates are weighted averages of country data based on World GDP shares. CESEE 
aggregates are calculated as weighted averages of country data based on each country’s share in regional GDP. 
Cobwebs for individual countries are available upon request from the authors. 
6. In order to maintain that a cobweb closer to the origin represents less vulnerability some variables are inverted 
(sovereign ratings, domestic stock index, budget balance, deposit growth, industrial output growth, current account 
balance, FDI, net portfolio investment flows, net foreign assets, basic balance, return on equity, capital adequacy ratio, 
long-term foreign exchange deposit rating and relative bank stock price). 
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Table 1: Vulnerability indicators 
Group Indicator Interpretation
EMBI spreads
CDS sovereign spreads (5 or 10 year)
Sovereign rating (average of Fitch, Moody's and S&P)
Relative stock exchange index (to world index)
Vulnerability indicators,
of which:
All Pressures on the balance of payments or the capacity and willingness of a
country to deal with its external liabilities, ultimately leading to the possibility of
a sovereign default.
Current account balance External financing needs.
FDI and basic balance Which part of the external financing needs is covered by long-term and stable
capital inflows.
Short-term debt over foreign exchange reserves Estimates the capacity to confront a sudden stop in short-term capital inflows o
short-term debt rollovers with central bank resources.
External debt and external debt service Capacity to repay external liabilities.
Net portfolio investment inflows Potential short-term outflows in case of a sudden stop.
Net foreign assets (NFA) Structural measure of a country’s position as external creditor or debtor and
the effects in the case of a more pronounced depreciation of the currency.
All Detect imbalances in an industry with high externalities over the rest of the
economy.
Domestic banks' foreign liabilities over foreign assets Proxy for currency mismatches in case of a devaluation and the dependence
of banks on external sources of funds.
Long-term foreign exchange deposit rating (Moody's) Reflects the foreign investor sentiment about a country's banking sector.
Relative stock price index for domestic banks Represents the investor confidence vis-á-vis listed banks relative to the rest of
the stock exchange.
Loan-to-deposit ratio Measures whether credit is increasing faster than deposits and is financed
through other possibly less stable sources.
Share of foreign exchange loans in total loans Measure of the currency mismatch of bank clients, and the potential increase
in non-performing loans in case of a strong depreciation.
Non-performing loans (NPL) Gauges the pressure from non-performing loans on banking sector balances.
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) Solvency of the banking sector.
Return on equity (ROE) Profitability of the banking sector.
Budget balance
Public debt
Interest payments over budget revenues Indicates debt servicing pressures on public accounts and serves as a proxy
for the sustainability of a certain debt level.
Real M2 growth
Real deposits growth
Real credit growth
Industrial output growth Leading indicator of current and future economic growth.
Nominal interest rates
Consumer price inflation
Export growth Proxy for external demand and international competitiveness.
Variables determining investment and consumption propensity.
Proxies for market and international investor sentiment; also gauges contagion
from a global or other emerging market crisis.
Attempt to capture issues related to monetary policies, credit growth in the
banking system and the way it is financed.
Signal pressures from public finances on monetary and exchange rate policies
and indicate financing pressures for the public sector.
External indicators
Sentiment indicators
Real indicators
Monetary indicators
Fiscal indicators
Banking indicators
 
 
Market sentiment indicators (graph 6) illustrate that both regions were more positively 
assessed by financial markets in 2008 than before the other two crises under review. 
Market sentiment towards Latin America was even better than towards CESEE, with spreads 
reaching historical lows in both regions right before the outburst of the global economic and 
financial crisis. In CESEE, less pronounced direct economic ties with the US, the “EU/euro 
area-halo” effect7 (or an EU accession perspective) and good medium-term economic 
prospects (despite rising economic imbalances in some countries) seemed to bolster 
investors’ confidence in the run-up to the crisis. 
                                                                          
7. See Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007). 
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Graph 6: Sentiment indicators 
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But was there a corresponding decrease in vulnerability behind these optimistic 
market assessments? At least in Latin America the answer is yes. The conclusion is not so 
clear for the CESEE region. As graph 7 shows, external vulnerability in Latin America, the 
traditional “Achilles heel” of the region, had been reduced considerably before the current 
crisis. In 2008, Latin America had a more balanced current account (a relatively small current 
account deficit), thanks in part to the increase in commodity prices since 2003, financed by 
long term foreign investment (higher basic balance). Also, Latin America reduced the ratio of 
short-term external debt to reserves (increasing reserves but also actively extending the 
maturity of external debt), and switched external debt for domestic debt, a movement led 
by the public sector which was instrumental in reducing aggregate currency mismatches. 
The net foreign asset position of the region increased, especially for the public sector. FDI, 
however, was less abundant in 2008 than in August 1998 or December 2001, something 
which may be explained by the large privatization processes of the nineties. Even in those 
countries considered more vulnerable such as Venezuela or Argentina, external vulnerability 
indicators had improved. 
In the CESEE region as a whole, however, external vulnerability indicators tended to 
be worse in 2008 in comparison to previous crises. A number of countries, in particular the 
Baltics and SEE, experienced a considerable widening of their current account deficits. This 
was partly a result of booming domestic demand (both private consumption and investment) 
as well as adverse developments in global commodity prices. FDI inflows remained large, but 
—in most cases— did not fully cover current account deficits. This resulted in a pick-up in 
external debt levels over time. In particular, short-term external debt increased so that, 
despite a strong build-up in foreign exchange reserves, the ratio of short-term debt to 
foreign exchange reserves deteriorated in recent years, making some CESEE countries more 
vulnerable to ‘sudden stops’. Notwithstanding this general picture, some countries 
successfully reduced external vulnerabilities by strengthening their export base and thereby 
lowering their current account deficits. Also, short-term debt developments were not uniform 
across the region, again pointing a large cross-country variation. 
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Graph 7: External indicators 
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When looking at banking sector vulnerability indicators, Latin America also seemed 
to perform better than before previous crises (see graph 8). Ratings were higher, credit 
delinquency rates lower, currency mismatches, measured as the share of loans denominated 
in foreign currency, had decreased, banks had a net foreign asset position, and bank loans 
were on average not growing at a much faster pace than deposits. All these elements would 
at first sight allow to discard an “Asian 1997” type of crisis. Only the banking sector stock 
exchange index was clearly performing worse than before the previous crises, something 
probably derived from a negative market assessment of the sector after two decades of 
banking crises, and from the fact that many of the large banks in the region were 
foreign-owned and might not be listed in the domestic stock exchanges. 
On the contrary, increasing loan-to-deposit ratios in CESEE signaled that deposit 
growth could not keep up with credit growth, so that banks had to rely increasingly on other 
financing sources, in particular foreign funding. This showed up in an increasing ratio of 
foreign liabilities over foreign assets in many but not all CESEE countries, with the Czech 
Republic and Poland being notable exceptions. In a number of CESEE countries a large share 
of credits were issued in foreign currency but, again, average numbers hide substantial 
differences across countries (for instance foreign currency credit in the Czech Republic is 
minimal). Against the background of banks’ changing business profile (shift from government 
to private sector financing), bank capitalization moderated slightly over time, although the 
average capital adequacy ratio remained well above legal requirements. On the positive side, 
the non-performing loan ratio (NPL) improved, following transition-related banking reforms 
and the recent expansion of bank balance sheets due to strong credit growth. At the same 
time booming credit growth, rising bank efficiency, better bank governance (a result of the 
large-scale entry of foreign banks and improved bank supervisory and regulatory structures), 
and lower provisioning led to increased bank profitability. 
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Graph 8: Banking indicators 
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As graph 9 shows, in 2008 fiscal vulnerability indicators were in both regions in a 
much stronger position than before any of the previous crises (fiscal balances had improved, 
interest payments on public debt were clearly below historical averages, and public sector 
debt was more or less at the same level as in previous crises). Moreover, as the primary 
balances were larger and debt service put less pressure on revenues, debt ratios were more 
sustainable, and very low in the case of most CESEE countries except Hungary and to a 
lesser extent Poland. In the case of Latin America, the composition of public debt had 
a positive influence on vulnerability levels (longer maturities and less dependence on external 
or USD linked debt). 
 
Graph 9: Fiscal indicators 
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As shown in graph 10, monetary indicators for Latin America showed a less 
favorable situation, and a deteriorating picture for the CESEE region as a whole. In Latin 
America, real M2 and real credit to the private sector rose before September 2008 at high 
rates. The rate of increase of deposits was, however, also considerably higher, a factor that 
limits the potential risks of high credit expansion. In addition it was believed that such growth 
was part of a catching-up process to levels of credit over GDP in line with regional per capita 
GDP. In any case, this constituted a warning signal. For the CESEE region, indicators 
suggested a credit boom, as credit rose much faster than deposits, and this was reflected 
also in high real money supply growth, supporting the view that the banking sector had 
accumulated some vulnerabilities before the current crisis. Again developments differed 
across countries and, as in Latin America, convergence factors have played an important 
role. Still, as other studies show, in the second half of the current decade, levels of private 
sector credit to GDP had already become fairly elevated relative to the underlying 
fundamentals (graph 12) and there are indications that credit overshot in some CESEE 
countries towards the end of the boom.8 
 
Graph 10: Monetary indicators 
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Finally, as suggested by graph 11, in September 2008 both regions were better off 
also in terms of real and nominal indicators. In particular in CESEE, the monetary stabilization 
after periods of transition-related monetary distortions (e.g. hyperinflation) in many CESEE 
countries in the early-/mid-90s coupled with favorable global inflationary developments 
contributed to a more benign inflationary environment and thus also to falling nominal interest 
rate levels. In addition, the deep-rooted economic restructuring of the 1990s and EU 
integration allowed for a gradual expansion of industrial production capacities and export 
growth. 
 
                                                                          
8. For more details see Backé, Égert and Walko (2007) and Zumer, Égert and Backé (2009). 
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Graph 11: Real and nominal indicators 
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Graph 12: Credit levels 
 
The general conclusion from this set of indicators is that, even if there were important 
differences across countries, Latin America was better prepared than in the past to weather 
the global economic and financial crisis. Vulnerabilities had been strongly reduced, not only 
in the banking sector, but also in areas at the origin of previous crises in the region, like the 
public or the external sectors.9 Vulnerabilities in the CESEE region as a whole had increased in 
                                                                          
9. In Latin America the accumulation of vulnerabilities and the subsequent busts have typically arisen from booming 
external environments, rapid credit growth and GDP growth rates above potential. As the supply was typically too rigid 
to meet the increase in demand, countries started to accumulate external (current account deficits, external debt) and 
internal imbalances (excessive public sector spending, public debt). Ultimately, these trends proved unsustainable, 
leading to currency devaluation, inflation, a GDP contraction, and sometimes a government default. Sometimes the 
public sector also increased vulnerabilities (1982 debt crisis, 1994 Tequila crisis). Other times the central bank and 
the bail out of the banking sector were the main features (Ecuador 1999). 
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some areas in the years prior to the current crisis, notably in the external and banking sectors 
and with respect to some monetary indicators (in particular credit developments). By contrast, 
sentiment, fiscal, as well as real and nominal indicators suggested a decline in the region’s 
macrofinancial vulnerabilities over time. However, as mentioned above, these regional 
tendencies hide major differences in levels and dynamics across individual CESEE countries. 
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Box 1: Vulnerability indicators and crisis impact – an empirical analysis for EMBI 
spreads and growth 
In this box we assess empirically to what extent the vulnerability indicators used in the paper 
can also be used to predict the impact of the crisis. More specifically, we regress the changes 
in selected financial and real indicators (the EMBI spread and GDP growth rates) after the 
crises of 1998, 2001 and 2008 on vulnerability indicators before the crises.10 
Our dataset comprises 20 countries, 11 from CESEE (we have added Slovakia 
and Slovenia to the sample used in the rest of the paper) and 9 from Latin America 
(adding Ecuador and Uruguay to the sample). Our dependent variables trace the initial 
impact of the crises on financial and real conditions. More specifically, we take the two 
months average EMBI+/EMBI-Global spreads before the crisis minus the two-months 
average spreads after the crisis and the difference between real GDP growth rates in the 
quarters before and after the crisis.11 
In line with the analysis above, we have aggregated the 31 vulnerability indicators 
described in this paper into six major groups (sentiment indicators, external indicators, 
banking indicators, fiscal (public sector) indicators, monetary indicators and real and nominal 
indicators).12 All the indicators are taken as normalized deviations from the long-run mean up 
until the moment when the crisis hits.13 A positive sign always means a decline in vulnerability. 
We also divide the sample into two sub-regions, CESEE and Latin America, to check for 
regional differences. 
First we calculate bilateral correlations. As shown in chart 1, the change in EMBI 
spreads after the crisis is negatively correlated with sentiment, real and nominal, and public 
sector (fiscal) vulnerability indicators before the crisis. Countries where these vulnerabilities 
are less pronounced before the crisis typically register a smaller increase in risk premia. 
These effects are, however, mainly driven by Latin American countries. In the CESEE (but not 
the Latin American) countries, it is mainly the monetary indicator which is correlated with the 
EMBI change. Changes in EMBI spreads after a crisis do not seem to be correlated 
with banking vulnerability indicators and external vulnerability indicators are correlated with the 
change in EMBI spreads only for Latin American countries. 
Turning to post-crisis changes in GDP growth, the correlation analysis suggests that 
GDP holds up better after a crisis in countries with smaller real and external vulnerabilities 
(chart 2). Also countries with soundness banking sector seems to suffer smaller recessions 
after a crisis, although this result is clearly determined by CESEE countries. Finally, an 
improvement in public sector indicators leads to a higher resilience of GDP in the case 
of LA countries. Sentiment indicators and monetary indicators seem to be uncorrelated 
with GDP rate of growth changes after the crisis. 
                                                                          
10. We are aware of the limitations of this analysis such as the presence of multicolinearity in the regressors and the low 
number of observations in our sample. 
11. We date the crises as follows: for the Russian crisis in 1998, the announcement of GKO default (17-Aug-1998); 
for Argentina in 2001 the sovereign default and currency board abandonment (31-Dec-2001) and for the subprime crisis 
in 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman's Brothers (15-Sep-2008). 
12. We have added ‘exchange rate misalignment’ to the set of real and inflation indicators. This is defined as the 
difference between the observed nominal effective exchange rate and the long run (equilibrium) nominal effective 
exchange rate which maintains the real effective exchange rate. 
13. We calculate for each vulnerability indicator the average and standard deviation between 1993 and July 1998 in the 
case of the Russian crisis, from 1993 to November 2001 in the case of Argentina default, and from 1993 to August 2008 
for the Subprime crisis. Then we normalize the data for August 1998, December 2001 and September 2008. By doing 
so, we avoid endogeneity problems in the regressions. 
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The correlation coefficients matrix (Table 1) confirms this visual inspection. 
 
Some other interesting issues also arise from the correlations coefficients analysis. 
First, sentiment indicators are strongly correlated with other vulnerability indicators, confirming 
the fact that market perceptions typically reward countries that have reduced their ‘actual’ 
vulnerabilities.14 Second, the correlation between the sentiment and monetary indicators is 
significantly negative. We thus use real deposit growth, a one-sided variable whose increase 
represents a reduction in vulnerability, as monetary variable in the regressions. 
We estimate two different regressions, one for each dependent variable, following 
this very simple model: 
 
 
We also include a common factor VIX15 representing the effect of each crisis on the 
reaction of each individual country.16 
The results suggest that EMBI spreads after crises are driven by the VIX change 
during the crisis and by sentiment and public sector indicators before the crisis (column 1). 
The coefficients suggest for example that an improvement in the public sector vulnerability 
indicator before the crisis by one standard deviation dampens the increase in the EMBI 
spread after the crisis by approximately 177 basis points. In column 7 we present the full 
model. The signs and significance of public sector indicators and of the VIX do not change. 
Splitting the sample into the two regions does not materially change the results either 
except for the sign and significance of the monetary and external indicators in the case of 
CESEE. This initially counter-intuitive result is dominated by some 1998 outliers in the CESEE 
countries. Excluding 15% of the extreme EMBI global variations provides a negative and 
significant coefficient for banking sector indicators. In other words, CESEE countries which 
have reduced their banking sector vulnerability registered a smaller increase in sovereign 
spreads after the crisis. The real and monetary variables become insignificant. 
                                                                          
14. Econometrically, this implies, however, that multicolinearity in the regressions may be a problem. To solve this, 
we estimate sequentially the model presented below, and eliminate the sentiment indicators from the final estimations. 
15. The VIX index measures the volatility implicit in Standard and Poor’s options, and is generally considered an indicator 
of global financial stress. 
16. We pool the data and estimate the model using OLS techniques. To avoid heteroscedasticity we use the standard 
White correction matrix. Alternatively, we could use panel techniques with fixed effect representing individual reaction 
to a global crisis, but as we have a small time dimension we prefer OLS regressions. 
Table 1: correlations coefficients matrix
EMBI change (bps) GDP growth change (%) Sentiment Real Public Banking Monetary External
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EMBI change (bps) 1.000
GDP growth change (%) -0.286 1.000
Sentiment -0.244 -0.006 1.000
Real -0.172 0.149 0.323 1.000
Public -0.117 -0.265 0.372 0.242 1.000
Banking -0.024 0.118 0.413 0.190 0.228 1.000
Monetary 0.020 -0.153 -0.429 -0.437 -0.112 -0.191 1.000
External 0.180 0.208 0.296 0.092 0.093 0.371 -0.266 1.000
VIX 0.298 -0.550 0.279 0.048 0.477 -0.082 -0.205 -0.049
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Significative correlations in bold and italics
Reactiont,i =  +  * VIXt +  * Vulnerabilityt,i + 
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Moreover, the fall in GDP after crises appears to be driven by real and external 
vulnerabilities before the crisis and by the increase in the VIX during the crisis —with the 
expected sign, but with a less significant impact on the dependent variable. These regularities 
are maintained in the full model but are largely driven by Latin American countries, where we 
also observe a positive and significant effect of public sector (fiscal) vulnerabilities (column 8). 
Except for the VIX index we do not find any significant effect of vulnerability indicators on the 
fall of GDP in the CESEE countries. 
 
Turning to the impact of pre-crisis economic policies on the regional strengths and 
vulnerabilities, economic policies played an important role in containing vulnerabilities. In Latin 
America monetary policy achieved in most countries low rates of inflation and inflation 
expectations close to the objectives. Exchange rates became more flexible. The assessment 
on fiscal policies is more mixed, as public debt was reduced, but the improvement of fiscal 
balances was to some extent due to cyclical reasons and increased commodity revenues. 
Authorities also managed actively other risks, such as those posed by episodes of large 
capital inflows and credit growth (see Box 2 for a more detailed explanation). FDI inflows 
during the last few years, driven by improvements in political stability and economic 
perspectives, were not a cause of concern, but short-term inflows, fuelled by high commodity 
prices and low global risk aversion, posed risks of credit and asset price bubbles and 
eventually of sudden capital outflows. In this context, most central banks took a number 
of measures to mitigate these risks, such as interventions in foreign exchange markets, 
Table 3: main results:
Variable EMBI LA CESEE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sentiment -206.26 (*)
     P > | t | 0.06
Real -181.27 -141.99 -263.77 174.16
     P > | t | 0.32 0.36 0.22 0.21
Public -176.61 (**) -190.85 (**) -196.84 (*) -118.42 (**)
     P > | t | 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.04
Banking 30.29 30.83 -70.54 -99.94
     P > | t | 0.76 0.73 0.58 0.19
Monetary (a) 7.68 45.34 36.29 150.44 (***)
     P > | t | 0.94 0.57 0.74 0.00
External 102.05 122.82 (*) -144.30 294.03 (***)
     P > | t | 0.18 0.09 0.34 0.00
VIX 3.37 (***) 2.80 (***) 3.63 (***) 2.70 (***) 2.72 (***) 2.82 (***) 3.93 (***) 6.03 (***) 3.59 (***)
     P > | t | 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 26 29
F-test (Probability) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
R2 0.423 0.361 0.407 0.337 0.336 0.358 0.461 0.613 0.649
VIF 1.11 1.01 1.55 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.43 1.70 2.28
Variable GDP LA CESEE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sentiment 1.49
     P > | t | 0.16
Real 2.67 (*) 3.18 (*) 3.30 (**) 3.42
     P > | t | 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.22
Public 0.20 0.11 2.52 (*) -2.48
     P > | t | 0.86 0.92 0.08 0.10
Banking 0.53 0.37 0.07 -0.64
     P > | t | 0.73 0.77 0.96 0.77
Monetary (a) -1.53 -2.11 (*) -1.41 -2.19
     P > | t | 0.18 0.06 0.13 0.23
External 2.04 (**) 1.99 (**) 1.89 0.37
     P > | t | 0.06 0.03 0.24 0.91
VIX -0.07 (***) -0.07 (***) -0.07 (***) -0.07 (***) -0.07 (***) -0.07 (***) -0.07 (***) -0.07 (***) -0.07 (***)
     P > | t | 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Obs 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 27 33
F-test (Probability) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.601 0.603 0.588 0.589 0.609 0.610 0.657 0.752 0.696
VIF 1.19 1.02 1.44 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.35 1.62 2.21
(a) Real deposit growth
(*) Significant 10% (**) Significant 5% (***) Significant 1%
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and in some countries price-based capital controls to discourage short-term capital inflows. 
Latin American central banks tended to be particularly concerned regarding overall credit 
growth and foreign currency lending and tended to take relatively more measures to mitigate 
the emergence of imbalances. 
In the CESEE countries, the recent academic and policy debate on capital inflows 
was strongly conditioned by EU accession and tended to be less sceptical about the 
risk of capital flow reversals than in Latin America.17 The EU accession process implied the 
need to lift all capital controls at the latest at the time of accession and resulted in a range of 
institutional provisions that arguably fostered capital inflows.18 Moreover, the region’s 
increasing financial integration with the rest of the EU, in particular the widespread foreign 
ownership of CESEE banking sectors, also contributed to these inflows and played an 
important role in boosting credit growth.19 There were also other reasons for the relatively 
more positive attitude towards capital inflows in CESEE countries. First, a relatively large 
share of capital inflows were FDI, which are rather seen as less volatile and more beneficial for 
economic development than short-term, speculative capital flows.20 Second, unlike Latin 
American countries the CESEE region had less experience with large-scale capital inflows, 
including their negative side effects, such as asset price booms, sudden stops and capital 
outflows. Given the institutional requirements of EU integration and the rather positive 
assessment of the economic impact of capital inflows, most CESEE central banks seem to 
have been somewhat less active than their Latin American counterparts to manage capital 
inflows. However, most CESEE central banks also took measures to rein in overall credit 
growth and/or the growth in foreign currency-denominated credit. Measures included 
increases in the reserve requirements, administrative and prudential measures including credit 
ceilings and a tightening of provisioning requirements. However, such measures often had 
only limited and at best temporary effects in achieving the desired results.21 Finally, some 
CESEE countries used fiscal policies to partly offset the expansionary macroeconomic effects 
of capital inflows. Overall, however, fiscal tightening was relatively limited in most countries. 22 
                                                                          
17. See Von Hagen and Siedschlag (2008). 
18. See Lane (2008). 
19. See Herrmann and Winkler (2008). 
20. See Abiad, Leigh and Mody (2007). 
21. A certain exception in this respect is Croatia which took a host of measures to rein in credit growth based on banks’ 
foreign liabilities and expanded the scope of these measures to retain their effectiveness. 
22. See Von Hagen and Siedschlag (2008). 
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Box 2: The management of capital inflows and credit growth in Latin America 
During the past few decades Latin American countries suffered recurrent economic and 
financial crises, with a similar pattern of economic overheating fuelled by excessive credit 
growth, increases in financial dollarization, reliance on foreign currency financing and large 
short-term capital inflows. The macroeconomic conditions in recent years —low global risk 
aversion, high commodity prices, and strong economic growth— fostered again capital 
inflows and credit expansion, increasing the risks that a similar “boom and bust” cycle would 
materialize. However, this time, vulnerabilities remained relatively subdued. In this box we 
briefly analyze why this may have been the case. In particular, what role policies may have 
played in managing these developments in Latin America. 
Capital inflows to Latin America increased during the period 2003-2008 partly due to 
structural improvements in the region, and partly due to low global risk aversion and high 
commodity prices. FDI inflows were generally considered beneficial, even if the ensuing 
exchange rate appreciation pressures could pose some concern. However, more skepticism 
was shown about the effect of short-term capital inflows, broadly considered more unstable 
and more likely to lead to exchange rate misalignments, credit and asset price booms. 
Among short-term capital flows, portfolio investment flows were considered more volatile and 
prone to sudden stops and exchange rate volatility, while the risks stemming from banking 
flows were more related to fuelling credit booms and overheating. 
The more conventional prescriptions to deal with episodes of large capital inflows 
had usually been fiscal restraint and flexible exchange rates, in addition to structural reforms. 
The effects of the latter can almost by definition only be observed in the long-term.23 
However, during the period 2003-2008, many Latin American countries implemented other 
measures to deal with large capital inflows, probably because the aforementioned policy mix 
was perceived as ineffective to deal with these pressing problems. Hence, within the general 
framework of flexible exchange rates, most Latin American central banks strongly intervened 
in the foreign exchange market when they perceived risks of exchange rate misalignment 
(overshooting). Foreign exchange intervention was more regular in Argentina and Brazil, less 
so in Colombia and Peru, and non-existent or very rare in Mexico and Chile, although the 
Banco de Chile seems to have recently moved in favor of a more active role in the foreign 
exchange market.24 Foreign exchange intervention was particularly large in Brazil and 
Colombia during the first half of 2007, when short-term capital inflows, and in particular bank 
inflows, accelerated (see graph). The policy of reserve accumulation during the last years 
mitigated exchange rate appreciation, and provided as a by-product foreign currency liquidity 
to intervene in the financial markets during the worst months of the economic and financial 
crisis. However, it has also been argued that reserve accumulation was not fully effective, and 
some analysts suggested that it was even self-defeating and fostered further inflows.25 
Moreover, self-protection against foreign currency liquidity needs or sudden capital inflows 
has also been considered as too costly and inferior, for instance, to international liquidity 
swaps.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
23. Among them, reforms to foster productivity and gain competitiveness, improvements in prudential regulation, or 
development of exchange rate derivative markets. See IMF (2007). 
24. See De Gregorio (2009). 
25. See Garcia (2008). 
26. See Rodrik (2006) and Blanchard (2009). 
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In Colombia and Peru, authorities resorted to capital controls, more stringent and less 
orthodox measures of discouraging capital inflows. In both cases, they were mainly price-
based capital controls, compulsory non-remunerated deposits on a fraction of specific foreign 
investments, albeit in Colombia some administrative measures were also adopted (e.g. a two 
years compulsory stay for FDI inflows to prevent portfolio inflows ‘disguised’ as FDI from 
overcoming capital controls). These capital controls were removed gradually when the 
economic and financial crisis impacted the region. The assessment of the introduction of 
taxes and burdens on capital inflows has been mixed. On the one hand, capital controls 
received criticism for being ineffective or inefficient. On the other hand, there is growing 
agreement that countries have few options left to deal with short-term capital inflows, and 
that these policy measures can be the “less bad” amongst them. 27 
At the same time, most Latin American countries experienced rapid credit growth, partly 
driven by the ongoing process of financial deepening in the region, and by a normalization of 
credit levels after the slump following previous financial crises. These developments were at 
times perceived as symptoms of excessive credit expansion and overheating. Most Latin 
American central banks monitored carefully credit growth and took complementary measures 
when standard tools such as interest rate increases were not effective enough to curb credit 
growth. For instance, in Colombia and Peru central banks increased reserve requirements in 
the first half of 2007 and 2008.28 
In addition, during the last few years central banks monitored carefully the currency 
composition of lending, and took a number of measures to reduce financial dollarization. 
These measures can be classified in three groups: long-term prudential regulation, ad-hoc 
regulatory measures and macroeconomic policies. Firstly, prudential regulation was 
increasingly designed to reduce the risks of financial dollarization. This included limits to net 
foreign currency positions of the banking systems (short and long) and in some cases 
additional capital requirements to cover risks arising from foreign currency positions 
[see BCRP (2005)]. Second, some central banks resorted also to ad-hoc measures to deal 
with foreign currency growth. For instance, the central bank of Peru tightened reserve 
requirements for foreign currency liabilities to increase the costs of foreign currency lending 
and to curb credit expansion. In Colombia the central bank tightened capital requirements 
on long/short net foreign currency asset positions of the banking system. Finally, some 
macroeconomic policies contributed to mitigate further increases in financial dollarization. 
For instance, floating exchange rates and the de-dollarization of public debt increased the 
perceived risks of foreign currency borrowing for the private sector. 
                                                                          
27. See FT (2009), as well as Mohan and Kapur (2009) and more recently Ostry et al. (2010). 
28. The Central Bank of Brazil also introduced a timetable to increase the reserve requirement on certain deposits 
to curb credit growth during 2008, but removed it due to the impact of the global crisis. 
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3 The Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on CESEE and Latin America 
Disruptions in global financial markets were transmitted to CESEE and Latin America through 
direct, indirect and second-round financial transmission channels (graph 13).29 Losses due to 
changes in the prices of ‘toxic’ financial assets in the portfolio of financial institutions (the main 
direct channel of transmission of the crisis) were limited in both CESEE and Latin America 
because financial sectors in these countries tended to exhibit a low degree of “sophistication”, 
including a negligible market penetration by complex financial products. In addition, 
capitalising on the profitable and booming local lending business in largely unsaturated 
markets seemed more promising for banks in CESEE and Latin America than engaging in 
foreign structured products for which demand was low or non-existent. 
 
Graph 13: Transmission channels of the global economic and financial crisis to 
emerging markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect financial channels of transmission relate to negative developments in asset 
prices, money and debt markets and capital flows due to the deterioration of foreign investor 
sentiment toward emerging markets. Losses of investor confidence hit emerging markets 
firstly via foreign exchange, stock and real estate markets. This in turn can have negative 
impacts on the real economy by lowering consumption and slowing investment activity. 
In addition, a weakening of currencies can drive up inflation and also pose a challenge for 
banking sectors in countries with sizeable foreign currency lending to unhedged borrowers. 
At the same time, increases in risk aversion could reduce the access to financing for 
                                                                          
29. According to Balakrishnan et al., 2009, second-round effects of spillovers from affected emerging economies 
to developed countries and/or spillovers among emerging economies would be conceivable as well. 
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governments (but also corporations and banks) on money and debt markets and/or make it 
more expensive. Finally, a slowdown (or a sudden stop) in capital inflows would hit mainly 
corporations and banks in countries with heavy reliance on foreign funding. One specific case 
could have been that of international banks that needed to deleverage and cut back 
exposures in emerging economies. 
Second-round effects refer to feedback loops from a slump in economic activity 
which may negatively impact financial institutions (predominantly banks), inter alia via 
deteriorating credit quality, rising non performing loans, declining profitability and increased 
problems to retain the necessary capitalization. 
These financial channels of transmission, together with a dramatic reduction in 
external demand and —in the case of Latin America— a slump in commodity prices, severely 
affected the real economy in both regions. 
Emerging markets went through different stages as the economic and financial 
crisis intensified (graph 14).30 Given no or negligible exposures to subprime or 
subprime-related assets and the ongoing raw material boom (relevant in particular for 
Latin America), financial markets and the real economy in these emerging market regions 
weathered the international financial market turbulences relatively well until mid-September 
2008 (Phase 1). 
 
Graph 14: Stages of the economic and financial crisis in emerging markets 
 
 
However, after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the global 
financial market turmoil gained markedly in depth and intensity and waning foreign investor 
confidence towards emerging markets dashed the hope of decoupling (Phase 2).31 In fact, 
in Phase 2 of the crisis, emerging markets (in particular those more financially integrated with 
global financial markets) were hit hard via the indirect financial transmission channels, with the 
CESEE region in some respects being hit harder than Latin America. At the same time, in light 
                                                                          
30. While general developments show a similar pattern in all emerging economies, differences across countries and 
regions are considerable. 
31. See Frank and Hesse (2009). 
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of the slump in global demand the foreign trade channel started to unfold. Financial market 
conditions remained tense in emerging markets until March 2009, when the long-lasting 
downward rally finally came to a halt and financial markets stabilized. 
Driven by highly accommodative monetary policies in the industrial world as well 
as large-scale coordinated support measures (e.g. by the IMF and the EU), global investor 
sentiment improved again, starting from the second quarter of 2009 and led to a strong 
recovery of financial markets in both regions (Phase 3). At the same time, the real 
transmission channels (especially the domestic demand channel) unfolded with some time 
lag and despite financial markets recovering, real economic activity remained weak. Phase 4 
of the economic and financial crisis started later in 2009 although feedback loops on the 
banking system through rising non performing loans and second-round effects on labor 
markets via rising unemployment can continue to be a drag on economic growth. 
Impact on Selected Financial Market Segments 
STOCK MARKETS 
Until the Lehman collapse, CESEE and Latin American stock markets outperformed other 
emerging markets. Only after September 2008 these markets came under intense pressure 
(graph 15) although stock markets in Latin America started to lose momentum already in 
July 2008. This can mainly be attributed to the large weight of commodity sector companies 
in Latin American stock markets,32 which came under increased pressure with the end of the 
global commodity price boom in July 2008. 
After the Lehman collapse, however, CESEE was more severely affected than Latin 
America, mainly due to the increasing external financing risks which resulted in large-scale 
international support (IMF, EU) for some countries (Hungary, Latvia, Romania). As a result, 
CESEE stock markets had lost some 70-80% in value by the end of February 2009, 
compared to pre-crisis levels, while losses were less pronounced in Latin America. 
Stock market developments diverged not only between but also within the two 
regions.33 In CESEE, the downward correction was particularly severe in the Baltic States 
and SEE, while in Latin America Peru and Argentina were affected the most. These national 
differences can to a large extent be explained by country-specific political, economic and 
social aspects, adversely impacting (foreign) investor sentiment. In many countries the stock 
market plunges in 2008 and early 2009 may also be seen in the context of long-lasting rallies 
before the economic and financial crisis. 
                                                                          
32. See Banco de España (2008). Commodity producers and exporters account for over 40% of the stock market 
capitalization in the region, a share much larger than in other emerging market regions. This can explain most of the 
excess stock market returns in Latin America during 2007 and 2008 compared to other emerging market regions. 
33. In most Latin American or CESEE countries stock markets are not too relevant for the economic performance. 
They are generally small and much less important as a source of finance or wealth than alternative markets such as bank 
loans. They are, however, of considerable value as “thermometers“ of market sentiment. 
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Graph 15: Stock market developments 
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Since early-March 2009 most Latin American and CESEE stock markets staged 
a significant rally, driven mostly by the improvement in global sentiment. The largest 
stock markets in Latin America (Brazil and Mexico) increased by more than 80%. Other stock 
markets increased between 50% and 140%. A similar picture emerges in CESEE, where 
stock exchanges in Hungary and Romania rallied by 100% and 170%, respectively, whereas 
those in other countries gained considerably less. At the end of 2009 stock markets in all 
Latin American countries were again at or above pre-Lehman levels. In CESEE, however, 
even the best performing stock markets reached only 70-75% of their pre-crisis levels. 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS 
Between the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis and the Lehman collapse, most 
Latin American and some CESEE currencies (namely those with flexible exchange rate 
regimes, except the Romanian leu) appreciated substantially (graph 16). But similar to stock 
market developments, downward exchange rate adjustments started in Latin America 
(e.g. Brazil, Chile) somewhat earlier than in CESEE given the collapse in global commodity 
prices in mid-2008. Tensions intensified thereafter, with capital outflows putting strong 
downward pressure on all currencies in both regions. In fact, the crisis reached Latin America 
as dollar funding markets seized up, putting enormous pressure on local foreign exchange 
rates. As a reaction, countries with floating exchange rates, such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile or 
Colombia allowed their currencies to depreciate quite sharply (40-50%), even if central bank 
intervention played a key role at moderating excessive volatility. In Argentina and Peru, 
where balance sheet effects are a more important concern, exchange rates were initially 
kept more stable by means of intervention and in the former case by rising interest rates. 
Downward pressures on regional currencies were exacerbated by other factors, such as the 
reversal of foreign exchange derivative transactions by nonfinancial corporations in Mexico 
and Brazil, or by the population’s increasing demand for USD as a safe-haven currency in 
Argentina. 
After the Lehman collapse, free-floating CESEE currencies came also under 
intensified market pressure. This was due to a mix of strongly appreciating (possibly 
overshooting) currencies before the crisis, negative global investor sentiment, perceptions of 
an approaching end of the policy rate cycle and, in some cases, adverse country-specific 
factors. By mid-February 2009 all floating CESEE currencies recorded substantial losses 
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vis-à-vis the euro, ranging from 20% in the Czech Republic and Romania to some 40% in 
Poland. Exchange rate pressures prompted many central banks to intervene either verbally 
(e.g. Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Hungary) and/or through direct foreign exchange 
market interventions (e.g. Hungary, Romania).34 Among the CESEE countries with fixed and 
quasi-fixed exchange rates, the currencies of Latvia and Croatia also experienced downward 
exchange rate pressures, and central banks in both countries intervened to keep the 
exchange rate within the +/-1% fluctuation band (Latvia, also supported by an IFI/EU support 
package) or to prevent a more marked weakening (Croatia). 
 
Graph 16: Exchange rate development 
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Since March 2009 most Latin American and most flexible CESEE currencies 
(apart from the Romanian leu) recovered substantially. All Latin American currencies but 
the Argentine peso, the Venezuelan Bolivar fuerte and the Mexican peso were quoted 
above their pre-Lehman levels at the end of 2009. Brazil and Peru started to restrict capital 
inflows again, given renewed appreciation pressures.35 By contrast, all flexible CESEE 
currencies were still below the September 2008 levels. 
MONEY AND DEBT MARKETS 
Money market tensions started to increase as of year-end 2007 and showed up in rising 
interest rates. In the first half of 2008, this development was mainly driven by monetary 
tightening to counter inflationary pressures, which peaked in almost all CESEE and Latin 
American economies in mid-2008. In the latter part of 2008, waning foreign investor 
confidence, rising political and economic uncertainties, heightened liquidity pressures on 
interbank markets, policy rate hikes to stop capital outflows and stabilize exchange rates 
(e.g. in Hungary) and speculative pressures against some currencies (e.g. Romania, Latvia) 
added to money market pressures. 
                                                                          
34. In addition, Poland and Hungary started to exchange EU funds (which were previously exchanged with central 
banks) directly on foreign exchange markets to support their currencies. 
35. In October 2009 Brazil introduced a 2% tax on capital inflows to the local bond and stock markets. 
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Sovereign Euro/Dollar bond yield spreads showed notable resilience during the first 
crisis year, especially compared to past crisis episodes. Indicative of the resilience were rating 
upgrades in some countries (e.g. Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Czech Republic and Poland) 
and continued access to international markets for sovereign and corporate issuers. After 
September 2008, however, yield spreads widened considerably in all countries. The fall in 
foreign investors’ risk appetite, downgrades by rating agencies (e.g. Baltic States, Hungary 
and Romania) as well as rising political and/or economic risks underpinned this development. 
Latin American and CESEE bond markets were rather heterogeneous. Spreads in higher risk 
countries (e.g. Argentina, Venezuela, Hungary, Latvia and Romania) widened considerably 
more than in less vulnerable countries.36 Since March 2009, spreads came down 
considerable across countries on the back of improving market sentiment. 
 
Graph 17: Sovereign 5-year credit default swap premia 
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Turning to risk premia, 5-year sovereign CDS spreads trended upward in 2008 and 
early-2009 on the back of sharply increasing global risk aversion and rising external financing 
and default risks (graph 17). Accompanied by a high degree of volatility CDS spreads peaked 
in Latin America and CESEE in early-March 2009, in Argentina and Venezuela somewhat 
earlier. Similarly to bond spreads, CDS spreads rose rather strongly in countries with larger 
imbalances. Amidst a more favorable global environment and stepped-up international 
support, risk premia came down markedly since then in all countries. At the end of 2009, 
CDS spreads for most CESEE and Latin American countries reached (or were even 
lower than) pre-Lehman levels. 
                                                                          
36. In some CESEE countries local currency-denominated government bond markets came also under severe pressure 
in the last few months of 2008. 
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CAPITAL FLOWS 
CESEE and Latin America were also affected by the financial turmoil via the tightening of 
global credit conditions, resulting in a slowdown (or temporary reversal) of capital inflows. 
Inorder to draw a comprehensive picture of the performance of capital flows, we look at total 
capital flows according to balance-of-payments statistics, at external debt statistics, and at 
claims and liabilities of BIS reporting banks. 
As regards total capital flows, the CESEE region as a whole experienced larger 
adjustments during the crisis than Latin America. However, while total capital inflows 
moderated much more for the CESEE region than for Latin America, given the higher 
inflows into Emerging Europe before the crisis, total inflows into CESEE remained in positive 
territory in the final quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009, while Latin America recorded net 
outflows in the last quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009. It has to be noted that a number 
of CESEE countries had sizeable current account deficits in late 2008, and thus required 
higher capital inflows at the time, while in Latin America the current account was close to 
balance. 
In more detail, in the second half of 2008 and then again in the first half of 2009 net 
capital inflows dropped considerably in CESEE, from some 12% of GDP to some 4% of GDP 
(graph 18). In Latin America, net capital inflows, which were less sizable before the crisis than 
in CESEE, also slowed down and even shifted into net outflows from the last quarter of 2008 
onwards. Almost all CESEE and Latin American countries recorded temporary portfolio 
investment withdrawals which were rather significant in some countries, mainly in the last 
quarter of 2008. The picture in CESEE changed in the second quarter of 2009, when portfolio 
investments turned positive on the back of improved global foreign investor sentiment. 
In CESEE net FDI inflows decelerated as well but remained positive in most countries and 
FDI inflows to Latin America were almost unchanged. In both regions total net inflows picked 
up again during the third quarter of 2009. 
 
Graph 18: Capital flows 
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Without other (public) investments (which include IFI/EU financial assistance) net 
flows to CESEE were about zero in the last quarter of 2008, and then again positive in the first 
and second quarters of 2009. However, for some CESEE countries, private financial flows 
were not enough to cover the financing needs in the final quarter of 2008. Therefore, 
in CESEE, the financing gap was covered with international reserves and, in some countries, 
by making recourse to IFI/EU credit (for more details see section 4). This is an important 
difference with Latin American countries, where financing needs were covered with 
international reserves. The worst-case scenario of a fully-fledged financial meltdown 
neither occurred in the CESEE region nor in Latin America. In this regard, international 
support measures from the IMF and the EU were instrumental in restoring confidence, 
and so was the increased role of emerging economies in the international policy discussions, 
notably in the G20. 
Second, external debt statistics (graphs 19 and 20) show that the corporate sectors’ 
gross foreign debt stock (excl. intercompany loans) fell or remained stable in absolute terms in 
most CESEE countries from mid-2008 to the first quarter of 2009. This suggests that fewer 
or no new credit lines were granted and/or some existing credit lines were not rolled over or 
were called due early, although demand side factors might have played a role too. Given the 
more favorable global environment, however, this trend reversed thereafter. In Latin America 
the corporate sector’s external debt relative to GDP remained steady or increased 
moderately in most countries in this period, Argentina being the exception. The October 2009 
IMF Global Financial Stability Report suggests, however, that roll-over rates of foreign 
exchange-denominated corporate debt were during the peak of the crisis substantially 
lower in Latin America than in CESEE. 
 
Graph 19: External debt structure by debtors in CESEE 
External debt structure by debtors in CESEE
Source: NCBs. OeNB.
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Graph 20: External debt structure by debtors in Latin America 
External debt structure by debtors in Latin America
Source: NCBs. BdE. OeNB.
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Third, looking at claims and liabilities of BIS reporting banks (graph 21, based on the 
BIS locational statistics), capital inflows to Latin America and in particular to CESEE remained 
fairly strong until and including the first half of 2008. Following the Lehman collapse, however, 
capital inflows slowed down, with the claims of BIS reporting banks decreasing noticeably in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 and throughout the first three quarters of 2009 in most countries 
in line with the process of global deleveraging. In particular, in CESEE there were outflows in 
countries with rather liquid banking systems (especially the Czech Republic), implying that 
parent banks may have temporarily withdrawn liquidity from these markets to meet 
their liquidity needs at home [Mihaljek (2009)]. While banking outflows were sizeable in a 
few cases, claims of BIS reporting banks have remained surprisingly steady in some CESEE 
countries, which can be traced back to the stability of parent bank financing [EBRD (2009) 
and ECB (2009)]. The liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis CESEE and Latin America 
turned negative in the second half of 2008 and first quarter of 2009. At first sight, this seems 
to be an indication that tight global liquidity conditions and limited access to foreign funding 
entailed banks and corporations in Latin America and especially in CESEE to repatriate parts 
of their foreign assets37. In some cases this was in fact supported by central bank measures 
(e.g. in Croatia). A closer look, however, shows that for CESEE a large part of the reduction of 
liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis CESEE was due to transactions of the National Bank 
of Poland which are related to foreign exchange reserve management (shift out of deposits 
with foreign banks and into foreign government securities) and balance sheet shortening 
(presumably to limit counterparty risk; for more details see Box 3). 
                                                                          
37. The figures may be distorted by valuation effects apart from exchange rate changes which, however, cannot be 
separately identified. 
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Graph 21: Claims and liabilities of BIS reporting banks 
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Overall the global economic and financial crisis had a major impact on capital flows 
to CESEE and Latin America, although the magnitude of the impact differed, depending on 
the type of capital inflows and the receiving country. External financing problems mounted in 
a few CESEE countries in late 2008/early 2009, and IFI/EU assistance was needed to stabilize 
the situation. The available data suggest that capital outflows were temporary and that in 
particular FDI inflows, intercompany loans, and, for some CESEE countries, multilateral 
assistance, played a positive role since the outbreak of the crisis. 
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Box 3: Capital Flows from BIS Reporting Banks during the Crisis: A Closer Look at 
the CESEE Region 
This box examines cross-border claims and liabilities of BIS reporting banks in somewhat 
greater depth for the CESEE region. It does so by exploring some country-specific 
developments which drive the aggregate figures presented above. 
 
Cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks 
A closer analysis of developments in the final quarter of 2008 shows that regional figures of 
cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks mask diverging trends within the CESEE region: 
 
 There was a reduction of claims on countries with liquid banking markets [Mihaljek 
(2009)], i.e. markets with comparatively low loan-to-deposit ratios (especially the Czech 
Republic, but also Poland and Croatia). IMF and national statistics (on international 
investment position and balance of payments) show, however, that Polish commercial 
banks succeeded in getting additional funds (above repayment amounts) from abroad, 
including from foreign banks during the last quarter of 2008. By contrast, the Polish 
central bank sharply reduced its external liabilities in the final quarter of 2008, as it 
decided to wind-up the existing stock of cross-border repo transactions. Thus, the 
substantial decline of cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis Polish banks 
(including the central bank) resulted very probably exclusively from the decline in their 
claims vis-à-vis the Polish central bank, while their claims against Polish commercial 
banks (partly being their subsidiaries) increased. At the same time, cross-border claims 
of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis Polish non-banks declined moderately. 
 Claims continued to increase in many CESEE countries in the last quarter of 2008. 
This suggests that parent banks retained/increased their exposure as non-parent bank 
financing was certainly not strong during the crisis [EBRD (2009) and ECB (2009)]. 
 In the Baltics, however, the reduction of claims (especially in the first half of 2009) can 
also be explained with the deep recession, i.e. with real economy arguments. 
 
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that claims on CESEE relative to GDP had 
risen much more strongly before the crisis than claims on Latin America, due to higher 
external financing needs. Thus, the potential for a reduction of claims was considerable, 
but in the event the reduction in claims on the CESEE region was not significantly higher, 
relative to GDP than for other EME regions (again, with considerable variation across 
countries, as observed in the chart below). 
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Cross-border liabilities of BIS reporting banks 
Cross-border liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis the CESEE region displayed a sizeable 
fall in the final quarter of 2008. Country-specific figures show that the difference is due to 
developments in Poland where liabilities fell substantially in the last quarter of 2008. What was 
driving this? A closer analysis yields the following points: 
 
 According to BIS data, the sizeable decline of cross-border liabilities of BIS reporting 
banks vis-à-vis Poland was exclusively due to the decline of liabilities vis-à-vis banks 
located in Poland (including the central bank), while the liabilities vis-à-vis non-banks 
increased moderately. 
 Cross-border liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis Polish banks should be reflected 
by and large in corresponding external asset items of Polish banks (including the 
central bank) shown by IMF and national IIP statistics. Looking in addition at IMF and 
national statistics allows separating between Polish commercial banks and the Polish 
central bank. 
 According to IMF and national statistics, about three quarters of the decline of BIS 
reporting banks’ cross-border liabilities against Polish banks resulted from transactions 
by the National Bank of Poland (NBP): 
o Half of this reflected the NBP’s decision to invest into safer foreign government 
securities by reducing deposits with foreign banks (FX reserves management). 
o Half of this decline related to the NBP’s decision to wind-up the stock of existing 
cross-border repo transactions on both the liabilities and the assets side of the 
NBP’s balance sheet, presumably to reduce its exposure to counterparty risks: thus, 
both external assets and external liabilities of the NBP were reduced in parallel, 
leading to a reduction of both liabilities and claims of BIS reporting banks against the 
NBP. 
 About one quarter of the decline of BIS reporting banks’ cross-border liabilities against 
Polish banks resulted from transactions by Polish commercial banks (which are mainly 
subsidiaries of BIS reporting banks): 
o Polish commercial banks reduced their deposits with foreign banks abroad (partly 
BIS reporting banks as parent banks). This implied a net inflow (on the assets side) 
in the balance of payments. 
Moreover, as noted above (in the context of cross-border claims of BIS reporting 
banks), Polish commercial banks succeeded in getting additional funds by 
increasing their liabilities against foreign banks abroad during 2008 Q4. This implied 
another net inflow (on the liabilities side) in the balance of payments. 
Source: BIS. OeNB.
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BANKING SECTOR AND CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS 
Banking sectors in CESEE and Latin America were fairly resilient to the global financial turmoil 
until autumn 2008. Profitability levels remained high thanks to strong (albeit decelerating) 
credit growth and the share of non-performing loans was fairly low. The tight global liquidity 
conditions (also before Lehman), the slowdown in capital inflows (after Lehman) and banks’ 
increased risk aversion affected, however, bank lending throughout CESEE and Latin 
America. In most countries credit growth decelerated sharply or came to a halt in 2008 and 
the first half of 2009 (graph 22).38 Having said this, in some CESEE countries credit growth 
had been particularly rapid before the crisis (e.g. Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania). In Latin 
America credit growth moderated especially in the retail segment, while in CESEE loans to 
nonfinancial corporations decelerated more strongly. Within Latin America, the tightening of 
bank credit conditions was particularly important in Brazil, but the decline in credit growth 
was cushioned by the pick-up in credit granted by public banks and the national development 
bank (BNDES).39 
                                                                          
38. This process started already in 2007 in the Baltic States (in line with the earlier start of the economic downturn) 
and in Croatia (mostly due to restrictive central bank measures). 
39. Moreover, the central bank took measures to loosen credit conditions (in particular, a substantial reduction in reserve 
requirements), which contributed positively to credit growth. 
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Graph 22: Domestic credit growth 
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Deposit growth also came down to more moderate levels, in CESEE especially in the 
Baltic and SEE countries. This can be attributed to worsening labor market conditions and, 
in a few countries, temporarily waning public confidence in banks.40 At the same time, the 
currency composition of savings hardly changed, with the share of foreign currency deposits 
remaining fairly stable around 23%. In Latin America, deposit growth also slowed down 
markedly in most countries and some countries (e.g. Argentina) saw an increase in the 
proportion of foreign currency deposits (mainly USD) together with an important deposit flight. 
The latter reversed during the course of 2009. 
The worsening economic fundamentals amplified credit and foreign exchange risks 
(especially in many CESEE countries). The deteriorating global economic environment started 
to take a toll on borrowers’ ability to repay their loans, in particular in countries with 
depreciating nominal exchange rates and a high share of foreign currency denominated loans 
(e.g. Hungary, Poland and Romania). Consequently, the share of non-performing loans in total 
loans started to pick-up throughout Latin America and even more so in CESEE towards 
end-2008 and increased further during the first three quarters of 2009 (graph 23). In CESEE, 
this development was particularly pronounced in Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. The 
increased credit risks and the related higher need for provisioning started to put a strain on 
banking sector profitability in CESEE and Latin America. In CESEE, profitability indicators 
deteriorated particularly strongly in the Baltic States, where the banking sectors even 
recorded losses in the first three quarters of 2009. 
                                                                          
40. Some countries (e.g. Bulgaria and Croatia) experienced temporary deposit withdrawals by households in late 2008. 
For further details see Dvorsky, Scheiber and Stix (2009). 
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Graph 23: Non-performing loans 
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Graph 24: Capital adequacy ratio 
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Source: NCBs. OeNB. BdE.
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On a more positive note, CESEE and Latin American banking sectors were well 
capitalized and showed considerable resilience in confronting the economic downturn. 
Despite isolated episodes of individual bank failures (e.g. Latvia’s Parex Bank or a few small 
banks in Venezuela, the latter due to failure to comply with regulatory requirements and other 
factors) banking stability seemed not at risk in any of the countries under review. Capital 
adequacy remained stable at fairly high levels of over 10% in all CESEE and Latin American 
countries (graph 24), well above the internationally propagated 8%. This reflects higher 
capital adequacy requirements in many CESEE and Latin American countries against the 
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background of presumably more risky business environments, but in CESEE may also be 
the result of the dominant position of foreign banks with parent banks committing themselves 
to keep their subsidiaries’ capitalization at elevated levels. 
Impact on the Real Economy 
Economic activity in Latin America and CESEE was severely affected by the aforementioned 
disruptions in financial markets and the collapse in external demand. Before comparing the 
real economic impact of the global economic and financial crisis in Latin America and CESEE, 
however, three important observations shall be made. First, it is essential to account for the 
different starting points in terms of vulnerabilities at the onset of the crisis. As noted above, 
while most Latin American countries started from a favorable economic and financial situation, 
some CESEE countries piled up sizeable domestic and external imbalances during the recent 
boom period. In these countries the real spillovers from the global economic and financial 
crisis might have worked not so much as a trigger but more as an amplifier of an economic 
downturn that was already underway when the global crisis hit. Second, some of the real 
transmission channels —especially the domestic demand channel— unfolded their full impact 
with some time-lag. In most countries under review the crisis had hardly any visible impact on 
the real economy until the third quarter of 2008.41 In the final quarter of 2008, however, 
in parallel with the indirect financial transmission channels, the foreign trade channel started to 
kick in on the back of a slump in global demand, triggering a slowdown in economic growth 
in all CESEE and Latin American countries. This channel was particularly strong for CESEE, 
given the region’s high trade openness and the large share of manufactured products in 
CESEE’s exports. However, while the economic and financial crisis fully spilled over to the real 
economy in the first half of 2009 (with both foreign trade and domestic demand channels 
at work) and economic activity slumped throughout Latin America and CESEE, financial 
markets started to recover in the second quarter of 2009.42 Third, despite a high degree of 
overall synchronization across countries, the various CESEE and Latin American countries 
seem to differ considerably in terms of the relative significance of the different channels. 
The trade channel appears to have been the most prominent real transmission 
channel of the crisis for both regions. This is not surprising, given the regions’ high degree of 
trade integration with the EU, respectively with the US, and more broadly with the world 
economy through commodity markets. The collapse of trade flows was driven by the plunge 
in global economic growth in the second half of 2008 and exacerbated by the drying up of 
capital flows which are relevant for trade finance. The effects of the plunge in foreign trade 
volumes on GDP depended on each country’s trade openness and trade specialization. 
Alongside volume effects, sharp (but temporary) downward adjustments in global commodity 
prices put additional pressure on exports of major commodity exporters (e.g. Argentina, Chile, 
Venezuela and Peru). At the same time, imports collapsed on the back of a slump in domestic 
demand and gloomy export prospects, given the high import content of exports in some 
Latin American and CESEE economies. However, with imports falling stronger than exports, 
the contribution of net exports to GDP growth turned positive in most countries (graphs 25 
and 26). 
The slump in domestic demand in Latin America and CESEE in late 2008 and a large 
part of 2009 was inter alia caused by tightening credit conditions, deteriorating business and 
consumer confidence, worsening labor market conditions and a slowdown in remittance 
                                                                          
41. In the Baltic countries the economic slowdown (triggered by domestic factors) started somewhat earlier. 
42. Only some countries, such as Poland, continued to record moderate positive economic growth. This might be 
attributable to the lower initial levels of vulnerability as well as a lower degree of export dependence. 
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flows. The composition of GDP growth thus showed major adjustments in domestic demand, 
especially in the first half of 2009. The biggest adjustments were seen in gross fixed capital 
formation, which is the most cyclical component and affected most directly by changes 
in the availability and cost of funding.43 The slowdown in investment was generally more 
pronounced in CESEE (especially in the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria, where this 
component of domestic demand had shown very strong dynamics in the run-up to the crisis) 
than in Latin America, although in this region Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico showed an 
important slowdown. Developments were similar, albeit not as severe, in private consumption, 
with the slowdown being more pronounced in the Baltic States, Romania and Mexico. 
 
Graph 25: GDP growth and its components in CESEE 
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Graph 26: GDP growth and its components in Latin America 
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43. In some Latin American countries the fall in commodity prices might have added to the slump in GFCF, 
as investments in the commodity sector explain a substantial portion of industrial investment. 
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4 The Policy Response So Far 
The policy response to the crisis in both regions focused on three areas: 1) Standard 
monetary policy measures, in particular changes in interest rates, 2) non-standard monetary 
and financial policy action, including liquidity and exchange rates supporting measures, and 3) 
fiscal policy. In addition, international policy measures also played a key role. 
Standard Monetary Policy Measures 
Widespread inflationary pressure characterized both regions when the crisis hit emerging 
markets in October 2008 and most CESEE and Latin American central banks (with flexible 
exchange rates) were in an upward interest rate cycle. During the first couple of months after 
the crisis started to impact emerging markets, central banks thus faced difficult choices. 
On the one hand they needed to stimulate demand by lowering interest rates. On the other 
hand they needed to prevent or contain currency depreciation —which may have re-ignited 
inflation and in some CESEE countries led to adverse balance-sheet effects— by retaining a 
positive interest rate differential vis-à-vis other countries. Therefore, monetary policy remained 
very cautious in most CESEE and Latin American countries until the end of 2008. At that time, 
the severity of the economic downturn became clear and the possibility of global deflation 
could no longer be excluded. 
Towards the end of 2008 most CESEE countries with flexible exchange rates 
started a process of monetary easing (Hungary after a sizeable interest rate hike in October) 
(graph 27) and by early-February 2010 they had reduced their policy rates by between 250 
and 550 basis points.44 Except for the Czech Republic, however, rates remained at higher 
levels than in major industrialized economies. Among the (quasi-) fixed exchange rate 
countries, Latvia cut its main refinancing rate by 200 basis points over the course of 2009, 
while other countries eased monetary conditions mostly by non-standard monetary policy 
measures. 
                                                                          
44. In addition, some CESEE central banks intervened verbally or through market operations to support their currencies 
(e.g. the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania). 
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Graph 27: Policy rate developments 
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At the end of 2008, also Latin American inflation targeting countries (Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru) reduced interest rates, initially at different speeds, with the 
majority of them “frontloading” the monetary stimulus. Colombia moved first with a rate cut in 
December 2008, followed by the other countries. On average, official rate cuts in inflation 
targeting countries amounted to over 500 basis points over the course of 2009 
Non-standard Monetary and Financial Policy Measures 
Since the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis, authorities in CESEE and Latin 
America have taken a range of extra-ordinary policy measures to counter the impact of the 
crisis on their economies.45 Broadly speaking, the aim of these measures was to safeguard 
financial system stability and to avoid —respectively minimize— spillovers from adverse 
financial market developments to the real economy. 
Most CESEE central banks took liquidity easing measures (e.g. reductions of 
domestic reserve requirements, broadening eligible collateral and increasing the frequency 
of auctions). Some countries also agreed on cross-central bank repurchase or currency swap 
arrangements in order to ease foreign exchange liquidity pressures. More specifically, in the 
final quarter of 2008, the ECB established agreements on repurchase transactions with 
Hungary and Poland in order to provide support to central bank operations with a view to 
euro liquidity provision. In addition, some central banks signed swap arrangements with 
Sveriges Riksbank (Estonia, Latvia) and Danmarks Nationalbank (Latvia). CESEE central 
banks did not, however, undertake credit or quantitative easing measures. Governments in 
CESEE broadened guarantee schemes for bank deposits in order to prevent bank runs.46 
The possibility of state capital injections into banks was established throughout the region, 
but banks were generally reluctant to draw on that form of relief, and only Latvia was forced 
to rescue a failing bank [OeNB (2009)]. 
                                                                          
45. See Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) for an overview of measures taken in EU countries and Ishi, Stone and 
Yehoue (2009) for an overview of measures taken in 40 emerging economies. 
46. In accordance with a proposal by the European Commission, all CESEE EU countries as well as Croatia now 
guarantee deposits up to the equivalent of at least EUR 50.000. Some countries implemented unlimited guarantees. 
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Most Latin American central banks (notably Brazil, but also others) also set in train a 
wide range of non-standard monetary policy measures to mitigate the effects of the credit 
contraction, with particular emphasis on facilitating the provision of dollar funding. This was 
possible because Latin American central banks had accumulated over USD 500 bn 
international reserves (about 10% of the region’s GDP), partly as a strategy to self-insure 
against external shocks and volatile capital flows, and partly due to a reluctance to accept the 
conditionality usually attached to multilateral lending. The strategy was not without costs (or 
criticism) but this time was nonetheless instrumental to deal with the sudden stop of capital 
flows. 
Latin American central banks took various measures including export credit 
(e.g. Brazil, Argentina), the refinancing of banking or corporate sector liabilities through the 
provision of USD (e.g. Brazil, Mexico and Chile), the extension of local currency-denominated 
liquidity provision via lower reserve requirements (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Colombia and 
Venezuela), broadening of the range of acceptable collateral to the central bank (e.g. Mexico, 
Argentina) and promoting state banks to facilitate new lending (e.g. Brazil, Chile). Financial 
sector rescue packages were not needed and financial sector support measures (e.g. Chile, 
Brazil) were of much lower magnitude than in industrial countries. Latin American central 
banks also stepped in to mitigate depreciation pressures. In Brazil and Mexico, reserves sold 
in the spot market for intervention reached 10% and 20% respectively of their international 
reserves, while intervention in the swap market amounted to an additional USD 32 bn in Brazil 
during the worst months of the crisis at the end of 2008. A greater relative effort to sustain 
the currency was apparent in Peru, where the degree of exchange-rate flexibility is limited 
by the high level of financial dollarization and the risk of stronger balance sheet effects.47 
All these measures met at least some of their objectives. International reserves 
proved effective for (temporarily) addressing specific problems in foreign trade financing, 
refinancing foreign currency-denominated loans and supplying the market with USD. 
From a broader perspective, the far-reaching changes in capital inflows did not result in a 
financial crisis in the Latin American region, which is a significant achievement. Government 
intervention was, however, not able to fully offset the significant tightening of credit conditions 
in either Latin America or CESEE. 
Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal policy responses to the crisis varied within and across the two regions. Generally, the 
fiscal response was determined by two key factors: First, the shape of government balances 
at the beginning of the crisis (graphs 28 and 29). Second, countries with high external 
financing needs —mostly in CESEE— needed to take account of a possible weakening of 
investor confidence which would complicate access to foreign funds.48 
Looking first at the CESEE countries, the Czech Republic and Poland decided on 
fiscal stimulus packages of around 1% of GDP in 2009 (broadly in line with the EU and the 
                                                                          
47. For a more detailed account of the measures taken by Latin American central banks see Banco de España (2009). 
48. It should also be noted that most CESEE and many Latin American countries are rather small and open economies. 
A strong fiscal stimulus would thus not only lead to higher domestic demand but also to an increase in imports. This 
consideration may have been an additional determinant of the fiscal policy response in some countries. 
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euro area average). The net impact of fiscal policy measures in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Hungary was, however, neutral or even deficit-reducing, i.e. pro-cyclical.49 
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Graph 29: Public finances in Latin America (2004-2010) 
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A relatively sound fiscal position allowed most Latin American governments to 
respond to the economic and financial crisis with a moderately counter-cyclical fiscal 
                                                                          
49. In 2008 Hungary and Romania reported budget deficits of more than 3% of GDP. Hungary has been subject to an 
EU excessive deficit procedure since 2004. Bulgaria reported a fiscal surplus in 2008, and puts a lot of emphasis 
on avoiding fiscal deficits, not least against the background of its currency board. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 51 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1002 
policy, which is in sharp contrast with the past. The average size of the fiscal packages 
(1.3% of GDP) has been above the level in the CESEE. Chile was the only Latin American 
country that was able to put into practice a forceful counter-cyclical fiscal policy, thanks to its 
fiscal rule that allowed saving funds of up to 12% of GDP. The implementation of the 
expansionary fiscal plans fell behind schedule in some Latin American countries. 
 International Support Measures 
In addition to national support measures, some countries received financial support from the 
IMF and other lenders. In Latin America the IMF and the US Federal Reserve, respectively, 
announced in October 2008 a non-conditional short-term liquidity facility and a swap facility 
with Brazil and Mexico. The IMF short-term liquidity facility was later changed into the new 
Flexible Credit Line facility (FCL)50 that Mexico and Colombia requested for precautionary 
reasons, but which was not drawn upon. Taking into account all multilateral and bilateral 
financing facilities, Mexico had at its disposal an amount of international liquidity close to 8% 
of GDP, while Brazil 2.3% and Colombia 3%. In addition, Argentina signed a swap agreement 
with the People´s Bank of China in the order of 3.4% of GDP. 
In the CESEE region, Hungary, Latvia and Romania received financial support from 
the IMF, the EU and other international financial institutions. The size of the Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBA)51 amounts to some EUR 20 bn for Hungary and Romania (18% and 14% 
of 2008 GDP, respectively), and EUR 7.5 bn (32% of GDP) for Latvia. In the case of Poland 
the IMF has approved a credit line amounting to some EUR 15 bn (5% of 2008 GDP) 
under the FCL facility. 
For Hungary, Latvia, Romania, IFI/EU support packages were instrumental in 
stabilizing their economies and in sustaining private capital flows. They may have also helped 
support private flows to other CESEE countries, although there is no direct evidence 
underpinning such spillover effects. In any case, private capital flows to CESEE started to 
recover from March 2009 onwards when it became clear that IMF resources as well as EU 
balance-of-payments support facilities for EU Member States would be substantially 
increased. 
Up until the end of 2009, only a part of the committed funds in CESEE was paid out 
and the unexpected economic weakening made it economically and politically more difficult 
for the receiving countries to implement the necessary policy changes. In particular, meeting 
the agreed deficit limits was challenging, even more so if structural fiscal improvements rather 
than ‘quick fixes’ were envisaged. Improvements in international financial market sentiment 
since March 2009, however, reduced the need for some supported countries to draw on 
these funds. 
In early 2009, the ‘Vienna initiative’ was created to co-ordinate the response of 
the main public and private stakeholders to the economic and financial crisis in CESEE 
[EBRD (2009)]. As part of this initiative, EU-based parent banks pledged to refinance and, 
if needed, recapitalize their CESEE subsidiaries, home governments allowed the parent banks 
to access national banking sector support packages for operations at home and abroad, 
                                                                          
50. Following the IMF definition, an FCL is designed for countries with very strong fundamentals, policies and track records of 
policy implementation and is particularly useful for crisis prevention purposes. 
51. Following the IMF definition, SBAs are designed to help to address short-term balance of payments problems. The financial 
assistance enables countries to rebuild international reserves, stabilize currencies, continue paying imports and restore conditions 
for strong economic growth, while undertaking policies to correct underlying problems. 
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and International Financial Institutions as well as host-country governments gave assurances 
of financial and policy support. In this context, one can also mention the EBRD’s “Vienna 
Initiative Plus”, which aims to address the issue of foreign exchange exposures together with 
other IFIs as well as home and host authorities by ensuring conducive macroeconomic 
policies and establishing supporting regulators frameworks. 
Overall, it has to be said that the international support measures for Latin America 
and even more so for the above-mentioned CESEE countries helped to calm financial 
markets and contributed to the stabilization of most financial market segments after the first 
quarter of 2009. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper has compared the impact of the global economic and financial crisis on CESEE 
and Latin America. Before the crisis, both regions were experiencing economic booms with 
rapid GDP and credit growth largely driven by capital inflows, especially in CESEE. These 
booms were driven by common as well as region-specific drivers. Strong world growth 
and easy global liquidity conditions were among the common factors. Specific features were 
inter alia positive expectations for EU convergence and future euro adoption in CESEE and 
the global commodity price rally in Latin America. 
Up to the third quarter of 2008, both regions were remarkably resilient against the 
global crisis. Part of this resilience is reflected by standard vulnerability indicators, which at 
the onset of the crisis indicated a better fiscal and real economic position as well as more 
favorable market sentiment than at the beginning of previous crises since the late 1990s. 
The main exceptions were the heightened external, banking and monetary vulnerabilities in 
some CESEE countries, precisely in areas that proved to be particularly sensitive in the 
context of the global economic and financial crisis. The degree of cross-country variation 
was considerable in the two regions and particularly within the CESEE region, countries 
displayed substantial differences in their macrofinancial risk profiles. 
It appears that improved economic policies have played a significant role in 
containing macrofinancial vulnerabilities before the crisis, in particular in Latin America, 
where authorities had learned the lessons from past crises and paid substantial policy and 
regulatory attention to signs of excessive short term capital flows, credit booms and the 
formation of potential asset price bubbles. In most CESEE countries large capital inflows 
and rapid credit growth were perceived as manageable and supportive to the catching-up 
process, while downside risks were seen as being contained. Measures to dampen credit 
growth were taken in a number of CESEE countries, but —with the exception of Croatia 
which took rather comprehensive and stiff measures— the effects were relatively moderate 
and temporary. Generally, the policy tool-box in CESEE (e.g. as regards the management 
of capital flows) was constrained by EU accession and the depth of financial integration. 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 the period of resilience 
ended and both CESEE and Latin America were severely hit by the crisis although the 
performance of individual countries became ever more differentiated. Initially, the crisis led to 
massive falls in asset prices including stock prices, fixed income securities, and in some 
CESEE countries also house prices. In parallel, world trade collapsed and external demand 
plummeted, which in turn led to a contraction in investment. As the prospect of a major 
downturn became ever more likely and labor markets worsened, private consumption also 
took a hit. 
In the later part of 2008, nominally flexible exchange rates depreciated substantially. 
Some central banks allowed this to happen, with weakening exchange rates ex-post proving 
to serve well as ‘shock absorbers’, mitigating the spillovers of the global economic and 
financial crisis to the real economy to some extent. Other central banks defended their 
currencies in order not to jeopardize their exchange rate system and/or to avoid possible 
negative balance-sheet effects. Some CESEE countries (e.g. Hungary, Latvia and Romania) 
had to resort to IFI/EU support packages to stabilize their economies. Overall, the more 
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financially vulnerable as well as the more open countries tended to be most severely affected 
in both regions. 
The financial market turmoil peaked in early 2009. More recently, CESEE and Latin 
America saw a recovery of equity markets, an appreciation of exchange rates and a fall in risk 
premia. Financial markets in most Latin American countries recovered to pre-crisis levels or 
even beyond, but in CESEE —except for risk premia— financial markets did not reach their 
pre-Lehman levels at the end of 2009. 
The crisis also had a major impact on capital flows to both regions which 
materialized in particular in the final quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. However, 
the magnitude of the impact differed again notably, depending on the type of capital inflows 
and the receiving country. Overall, capital flows moderated more substantially, although from 
higher previous levels, in CESEE than in Latin America. At the same time, CESEE displayed 
net inflows also during the crisis, while Latin America recorded outflows in the last 
quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009. This difference, however, is partly due to IFI/EU 
financial assistance to three CESEE countries for which international support packages 
were instrumental in stabilizing their economies and in sustaining private capital flows. Latin 
America was less dependent on external financing as it displayed a balanced current account, 
while the CESEE region had larger financing needs when the crisis hit. More in general, 
international support measures proved instrumental in restoring confidence and so was 
the increased role of emerging economies in the international policy discussions, notably 
in the G20. 
In CESEE, a key factor in sustaining overall capital flow dynamics was that 
intra-group loans of banks remained stable or even expanded. In Latin America, in turn, 
foreign bank funding was generally much less relevant as a source of finance, since most 
credit was financed by the local deposit base. On a positive note, the worst-case scenario of 
a fully-fledged regional meltdown has neither occurred in CESEE nor in Latin America. 
As a consequence of the crisis, credit and deposit growth decelerated markedly 
and banks in both regions are now confronted with increasing non-performing loans 
(comparatively more pronounced in a number of CESEE countries than in Latin America) and 
declining profitability, although with a considerable degree of cross-country heterogeneity. 
Bank capitalization has remained at high levels in all countries under review. 
The above-mentioned disruptions in domestic and international financial markets 
together with the real transmission channels, in particular the plunge in global trade flows, 
also had a very pronounced effect on real economic developments in CESEE and Latin 
America from late-2008 onwards, ultimately resulting in severe recessions in most countries in 
both regions. However, the real economic downturn in 2009 turned out more pronounced 
in the CESEE region than in Latin America. This can be attributed to the much higher 
export/GDP ratios and the substantially higher share of manufactured goods compared to 
Latin American countries, but also to the financial vulnerabilities of a number of CESEE 
countries. 
The policy response to the crisis in both regions focused on standard and 
non-standard central bank and financial policy actions as well as on fiscal measures. 
Standard monetary policy remained very cautious in most countries until the end of 2008 
when most countries embarked on a process of monetary easing. Nevertheless, in most 
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CESEE and Latin American countries policy rates remained at higher levels than in major 
industrialized economies. On a positive note, neither Latin American countries nor most 
CESEE countries (except for Hungary) had to hike interest rates to defend exchange rates. 
Since the outbreak of the crisis, authorities in both regions took also a range of extra-ordinary 
policy measures to stabilize financial systems and to reduce spillovers to the real economy. 
Fiscal policy responses to the crisis varied within and across the two regions and were 
mainly determined by the fiscal situation at the beginning of the crisis and the threat of a 
possible weakening of investor confidence. Only a few CESEE countries were in a position 
to run —moderate— counter-cyclical fiscal policies, while others had to engage in pro-cyclical 
tightening to retain or regain investor confidence. In contrast, relatively sound fiscal positions 
prior to the crisis allowed most Latin American governments to respond to the crisis with —at 
least moderately— countercyclical fiscal policy although their implementation fell behind 
schedule in some countries. 
The economic downturn seems to have reached a bottom, although the pattern and 
pace of economic recovery is still rather unclear. The growth outlook for Latin America 
improved on the back of global market sentiment since March 2009, and stabilized for 
CESEE countries. The main reasons for the better prospects for Latin America over the 
near-term can be traced back to the renewed increase in commodity prices and the more 
limited impact of the financial shock due to reduced vulnerabilities and agile policy responses. 
The growth outlook in advanced economies represents, however, a major uncertainty for 
both regions. 
For the CESEE region integration into European banking networks turned out to be 
an asset during the crisis (while it certainly had also played a role in boosting the boom before 
the crisis). While financial vulnerabilities played a key transmission role in several CESEE 
countries, their high dependence on the export of manufactured goods made for a particularly 
strong impact of the trade channel, as world trade and export demand collapsed in late 2008. 
The trade channel impacted Latin America mostly through the drop in commodity prices and 
export demand. 
The EU anchor has also been beneficial for CESEE countries, as it provides a 
functioning institutional and regulatory framework that promotes the convergence process 
and is expected to prevent extreme policy slippages. Latin America, in turn, has benefited 
from policies that have reduced its vulnerabilities prior to the crisis and have been able to 
become countercyclical after it, contrary to past experiences. 
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